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Abstract—In this paper a new idea of digital images finger-
printing is proposed. The method is based on quaternion en-
cryption in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode. Quater-
nions are hyper-complex numbers of rank 4 and thus often
applied to mechanics in three-dimensional space. The encryp-
tion algorithm described in the paper is designed for gray-
tone images but can easily be adopted for color ones. For
the encryption purpose, the algorithm uses the rotation of
data vectors presented as quaternions in a three-dimensional
space around another quaternion (key). On the receiver’s side,
a small amount of unnoticeable by human eye errors occurs in
the decrypted images. These errors are used as a user’s digital
fingerprint for the purpose of traitor tracing in case of copy-
right violation. A computer-based simulation was performed
to scrutinize the potential presented quaternion encryption
scheme for the implementation of digital fingerprinting. The
obtained results are shown at the end of this paper.
Keywords—cryptography, multimedia, security, watermarking.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, delivering sensitive digital multimedia contents
confidentially over vulnerable public networks is a matter
of high importance. The problem received much attention,
however the number of possible methods which enable the
transmitted data interception, is increasing rapidly.
Quaternion encryption as presented in [1], [2] uses the
unique properties of quaternions in order to rotate vec-
tors of data in three-dimensional space. Because of their
unique structure, quaternions are commonly used in place
of matrices to perform rotations [3]. In a proposed method,
the authors treat a data vector rotation as its encryption.
Due to specific quaternion algebra, the encryption based
on a quaternion rotation will be computed much faster than
encryption based on a matrix multiplication [3], [4]. Addi-
tionally, when encrypting a color image in RGB representa-
tion, it is possible to increase the encryption efficiency even
further. In that case a single quaternion can successfully
store information about pixel all three colors.
The model proposed by authors in [1], [2] uses the Elec-
tronic Code Book (ECB) encryption mode. However, it is
well known that altering encryption by including depen-
dencies between corresponding blocks of encrypted data
will result in achieving a greater security. Development of
the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) implementation resulted
in a algorithm discovery that generates a small amount of
unnoticeable errors on the receiver’s side during the de-
cryption process. These sets of errors is used as digital
fingerprints for the purpose of pirate tracing. In this case,
digital fingerprinting should be considered as an encryption
technique additional feature.
The purpose of this paper is to present the implementa-
tion and quaternion experimental results encryption with
a digital fingerprinting. The security issue of the quater-
nion encryption algorithm has been discussed in [5]–[7].
To the best of authors knowledge, this is the first work
which shows a digital fingerprinting for images based on
quaternion calculus. It is important to note that the pro-
posed algorithm is an ongoing work. Further studies on the
method are necessary and are highlighted in the paper.
2. Quaternion Calculus
Quaternions are hyper-complex numbers of rank 4 and have
two parts – a scalar part and a vector part, which is an ordi-
nary vector in a three-dimensional space R3. A quaternion
q is defined by [8]:
q = w+ xi+ y j + zk , (1)
where w, x, y, z are real coefficients of quaternion q, and i,
j, k are imaginary units with the following properties [8]:
i2 = j2 = k2 = i jk =−1 ,
i j =− ji = k ,
jk =−k j = i ,
ki =−ik = j ,
A quaternion could also be written as a transposed vector
or as a composition of scalar part w and vector part ~v.
q =
[
w x y z
]T or q = (w,~v) = (w, [x y z]2) . (2)
The sum of two quaternions q1, q2 is defined by adding the
its corresponding coefficients, i.e. in the same manner as
for complex numbers [5]:
q1+q2 =(w1+w2)+(x1+x2)i+(y1+y2) j+(z1+z2)k . (3)
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Pixels of a gray-tone image
Fig. 1. Encryption of a gray-tone image using the quaternion method.
The product of two quaternions is more complex due to its
anticommutativity of the imaginary units during the mul-
tiplication process. The product of the two quaternions
q1, q2 consists scalar and vector products [5]:
q1 ·q2 = (w1w2−~v1 ·~v2, w1~v2 +w2~v1 +~v1×~v2) . (4)
Furthermore, it is important to define the other properties:
a conjugate q∗, a norm ‖q‖ and an inverse q−1 of a quater-
nion q:
q∗ = w− xi− y j− zk ‖q‖=
√
w2 + x2 + y2 + z2 , (5)
q−1 =
q∗
‖q‖2 =
w− xi− y j− zk
w2 + x2 + y2 + z2
. (6)
It is important to notice that in the case of a unit quaternion,
for which the norm is equal to 1, there is the following
relation: q−1 = q∗.
3. Quaternion Encryption
The proposed encryption scheme is based on quaternion ro-
tation by creating a quaternion (key) around will be rotating
another quaternion (data). Let’s consider two quaternions
q = [w x y z]T and P = [0 a b c]T , where a vector [a b c]T ,
which represents a vector part of the quaternion P, will
store data to rotate around a unit quaternion q (key). The
obtained quaternion Prot will be a spatial mapping of the
rotated data vector [a b c]T . The quaternion rotation is
written as:
Prot = q ·P ·q−1 . (7)
There are two possible ways of implementing a proposed
quaternion encryption. First approach called quaternion
method focuses on the Eq. (7) and it is entirely based on
quaternion calculus. The alternative matrix method intro-
duces a rotation matrix [1], [2], [5], which enables the
implementation of quaternion encryption via a matrix mul-
tiplication. The matrix method is easier to implement, how-
ever it lacks the fast computing advantages of the quater-
nion method [3], [4]. In presented algorithm the quaternion
method is used.
The quaternion method is entirely based on the quaternion
rotation shown in Eq. (7). It is possible to optimize the
rotation process by extending the vector part of the quater-
nion P in order to obtain a new quaternion B, as it is shown
in Eq. (8) [1], [2].
P =

0,

 ab
c



→ B =

0,

 a1 a2 a3b1 b2 b3
c1 c2 c3



 . (8)
The encryption and decryption process for the quaternion
method with the new extended quaternion B (meant to
store data information) is shown in Eqs. (9) and (10) re-
spectively.
Brot = q ·B ·q−1 , (9)
B = q−1 ·Brot ·q , (10)
where Brot is the rotated quaternion B.
It is also possible to compute a rotation matrix [1], [2],
[5]–[7] in order to obtain quaternions of higher order that
can be treated as subsequent encryption keys and therefore
improve the encrypted data security. The number of com-
puted higher order quaternion-keys is equal to 3n, where n
denotes the order’s size.
In order to better understand the encryption process via
the quaternion method let’s consider an example as shown
in Fig. 1. Assume that aim is to encrypt a random gray-
tone image, represented by pixels which values are in
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Fig. 2. Example of dependency between matrices in quaternion encryption algorithm for CBC mode.
the 0–255 range. First is to organize those pixels in the
appropriate data matrices B (step 1), and then convert those
matrices to quaternions B (step 2) and perform the quater-
nion rotation according to Eq. (9) (step 3).
4. Cipher Block Chaining Mode
of Encryption
The model presented in [1], [2] concerns encryption in
Electronic Code Book mode, which means that the blocks
of data B are encrypted and decrypted separately according
to Eqs. (9) and (11). However, the security issue of the
encryption could be improved significantly if a dependency
between subsequent data blocks was introduced.
The solution is to adapt the encryption method to use the
Cipher Block Chaining encryption mode, i.e., a bitwise bi-
nary addition of data matrices B and matrices Brot, which
have been acquired via quaternion encryption in the previ-
ous steps (Fig. 2). In the first step a random initialization
matrix IM is necessary. This matrix, IM, must be of the
same size as all matrices B. As a result a new matrix Bmod
is obtained which will be of the same dimension as ma-
trix B and the values of its elements will be randomized.
At this point a quaternion encryption will begin where the
new data matrix Bmod will be converted to a quaternion
Bmod and rotated according to Eq. (9).
However, to make a bitwise binary addition into such an
encryption process one have to remember the fact that the
values obtained in matrices Brot are not of a decimal form.
This is due to the process of quaternion encryption, which
is why the binary addition must support not only deci-
mal numbers but also floating point numbers. This issue is
addressed in the next section.
5. Error Occurrence
Floating point representation is similar in concept to scien-
tific notation. According to standard IEEE-754, a floating
point number consists of a sign bit, exponent bits and sig-
nificant bits also known as coefficient or mantissa bits. It
is important to notice that during the bitwise binary addi-
tion of elements B and Brot matrices, there is not possi-
bility to allow the addition of all corresponding bits with
modulo 2 arithmetic (XOR operation). This could lead
to a situation where a special number type could be ob-
tained [9]. It is important to implement exceptions for all
such numbers. Moreover, there is necessity to support the
appropriate range of precision for floating point numbers.
According to a paper [9], the range for single precision
floating point number is 1.2 ·10−38 . . . 3.4 ·1038.
The main problem occurs during the decryption process.
While performing quaternion calculations on the receiver’s
side it is impossible to achieve exactly the same value of
a floating point number as it is on the transmitter’s side.
This could lead to a situation where errors could be en-
countered in the decrypted data. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to minimize the number of errors. For example, in
case of gray-tone images, it is possible to keep the errors
at an unnoticeable by human eye level of a maximum of
±3 pixel value even on image regions with uniform color
(gray tone).
In order to better understand error behavior on the receiver’s
side, an example as shown in Fig. 3 is considered. The au-
thors use an initialization matrix IM in the first step of the
CBC mode of encryption. Figure 3 presents only one pair
of subsequent elements from data matrix B and initializa-
tion matrix IM. In order to perform the XOR operation on
those elements to convert them to their binary floating point
representation according to standard IEEE-754 is proceed
at first. After the XOR operation a floating point number
(a value from matrix Bmod) is obtained which is then en-
crypted with proposed quaternion algorithm and decrypted
on the receiver’s side. However, due to the quaternion cal-
culations a slightly different floating point number is ob-
tained. If a rounding to the fourth digit after the decimal
point is implemented, the ability to control the error size at
an acceptable level of a maximum of ±3 on the receiver’s
side is achieved (Fig. 3).
Rounding to any further digit after the decimal point could
lead to a situation where the obtained floating point num-
ber would be wrongly represented in chosen variable sec-
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Fig. 3. Error size shown for some corresponding values in terms of the gray-tone image data.
tion of the binary floating point number representation. It
would thus generate a significant error. When perform-
ing the XOR operation with the element from IM on the
receiver’s side, an element of decrypted data matrix Brot
is obtained which is identical to or different from (maxi-
mum ±3 in terms of the gray-tone image data) the original
element of data matrix B on the transmitter’s side.
Up to this point the reader will probably have started won-
dering why the binary floating point representation was di-
vided into two sections: constant and variable. According
to the beginning of this section, the authors cannot allow
the addition of all corresponding bits of matrices B and IM
elements with modulo 2 arithmetic. During the XOR oper-
ation a variable part of the binary floating point representa-
tion is defined for which such an operation is performed –
it contains 3 bits of exponent and 7 bits of mantissa
(Fig. 3). The other bits are considered invariable and have
constant values. Such an approach (the amount of variable
bits) is necessary in order to represent the largest value al-
lowed for a gray-tone image: 255. It will also eliminate
the threat of generating special values, and it will solve the
precision problem for floating point numbers. Performing
the XOR operation on the allowed variable bits will result
in producing values in the range of 2–510. The authors
will not be able to obtain values less than 2 due to the
used constant bit values for each binary floating point rep-
resentation. Therefore, pixels are treated with a value of 0,
and 1 of a gray-tone image, as an equivalent of a pixel
value of 2. Thus the produced error is in the allowed range
of ±3.
6. Fingerprinting as an Additional
Feature
There are two complementary methods for multimedia con-
tent and copyright protection. The first method is an en-
cryption, which main objective is to provide a protected
data confidentiality. This technique ensures that only users
with the appropriate decryption keys will be able to de-
crypt the transmitted multimedia content and use it. Un-
fortunately, even the best encryption standard do not assure
sufficient protection because after the decryption a user with
access to the content is able to redistribute it without the
author’s permission and violate copyrights in the process.
The second method is digital fingerprinting [10]–[19],
which involves the embedding of an additional hidden data
into multimedia content. These data are called fingerprints
and each fingerprint identifies one individual user of the
system. It is important that the fingerprints must be em-
bedded in the multimedia content in such way that they
remain invisible to the human eye, or at least do not bother
the user. An analysis of the embedded data in a pirate
copy aims to identify by whom the copy was illegally re-
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Fig. 4. General scheme of the multimedia distribution system based on a quaternion encryption.
leased. The presence of the fingerprint in the examined
illegal copy is the basis for the rogue users identification,
which consequently leads to the prosecution and conviction
of pirates.
It should be assumed that pirates are aware of the presence
of fingerprints in their copies and that they will carry out
various attacks intended to remove the fingerprints. The
greatest threat to mass multimedia distribution are orga-
nized pirates groups who analyze the fingerprinted copies
available to them and on this basis produce a pirated copy
which is fingerprints free or contains a damaged fingerprint
which does not identify the real pirates. Such attacks are
called collusion attacks [10], [20]–[22].
The quaternion encryption scheme presented in this paper
can be used not only for multimedia data encryption, but
also as a tool to detect pirates by utilizing error patterns
which occur during the decryption. The first stage is mul-
timedia content encryption ordered by users. Copies in-
tended for each user are encrypted separately with different
keys and then sent via multiple unicast transmissions. Keys
must also be provided separately for each user in a secure
manner.
In the second stage, each user performs decryption of the
multimedia content. The artifacts which occur in decrypted
images are dependent on the encryption key which makes
them different for each user and will be considered as fin-
gerprints. Figure 4 represents this scheme of digital finger-
printing via quaternion encryption.
The last stage takes place after capturing an illegally dis-
tributed copy. The fingerprint must be extracted from the
illegal copy and then the detection of pirates is performed
by non-blind detection [10]. Fingerprint extraction is done
by calculating the difference between the original image
and the pirate copy. In this case, original unmarked data
is used as a reference in the extracting process a finger-
print from an illegal copy. Pirates identification of is based
on the correlation analysis of the extracted fingerprint and
the fingerprints of all users. If the correlation coefficient
of the fingerprint extracted from the pirated copy and the
i-th user’s fingerprint exceeds a detection threshold, the i-th
user is considered as guilty. Thus, there is a need to define
an appropriate detection threshold.
Detection thresholds are not selected analytically, but ex-
perimentally. The threshold should be specified in order to
meet specific requirements for the application of the fin-
gerprinting system. There are three possible scenarios that
impact the choice of threshold [21]. In the “catch one” sce-
nario the main goal is error-free identification of at least one
pirate without accusing any innocent user. This criterion
is especially important for collection of evidence. In this
scenario the detection threshold is usually very high. In the
“catch many” scenario, accusing several innocent users is
acceptable for the benefit of detecting more pirates. Two
groups of suspects are thus obtained: a correctly identi-
fied pirates and a wrongly accused users. In this scenario
the detection threshold is much lower than in the previous
one. In the “catch all” scenario the aim is to detect all of
the pirates with an acceptable number of wrongly accused
users. This criterion applies in cases where it is necessary
to detect all users involved in the crime at all costs. In this
scenario the selected detection threshold is the lowest.
7. Simulation Results
In each of the performed simulations 100 users ordered the
same images, 243 by 243 pixels in size and in an 8-bit
grayscale. Six different images were used for the simula-
tions and this process was repeated 5 times for each image.
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This gave 30 performed simulations. In order to test the fin-
gerprints’ robustness the authors simulated collusion attacks
in which 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 pirates were involved. The
damaged fingerprint was extracted from a pirated copy, then
the correlation coefficients with the fingerprints of all users
were calculated and compared to fixed detection thresholds:
0.12, 0.13, 0.14.
A simulated attack was a linear collusion where the finger-
printed copies that were available to pirates were averaged.
All fingerprinted copies were averaged with equal weight,
so the energy of each pirate’s fingerprint was reduced by
the same factor, which is the inverse of the number of pi-
rates. This means that the risk of being detected is evenly
distributed among the pirates, so it is a fair collusion [20].
More importantly, this attack does not degrade the visual
multimedia content quality. Therefore, the linear collusion
attack by averaging the fingerprinted copies, is the most
probable attack [20].
Figure 5 presents the original image, the encrypted image
based on presented CBC quaternion third order encryption
algorithm and the decrypted image that is automatically
embedded with a random pattern fingerprint. It should
be noted that embedded fingerprint invisibility has been
reached. The Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) for the
fingerprinted image is +58.64 dB. In this case the original
image is considered as a useful signal and the fingerprint
is considered as noise.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5. Example of joint quaternion encryption and fingerprint-
ing: (a) original image, (b) encrypted image, (c) decrypted and
fingerprinted image (PSNR = +58.64 dB), (d) fingerprint shown
as a pattern of errors.
The correlation analysis of the embedded fingerprints has
been performed. The analysis was run for 6 images or-
dered by 100 users. The auto-correlation coefficient of the
fixed user’s fingerprint was always equal to 1. The cross-
correlation coefficients with the remaining 99 fingerprints
was always less than 0.1. Such properties are possible be-
cause each fingerprint is very long, as it covers the entire
image.
Figure 6 shows the correlation coefficients between the fin-
gerprint from the pirate copy and the fingerprints of all the
users in case of 15 pirates involved in the attack. The pi-
rates who performed a collusion attack are users with the
lowest ID numbers. The correlation coefficient values for
the pirates decrease accordingly to the expanding number
of attackers. However, the correlation coefficients of every
guilty user are still higher than for any innocent user. It is
possible to set an appropriate detection threshold in order
to achieve a differentiation between pirates (colluders) and
honest users.
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Figure 7 show the results of the robustness testing. Each
chart shows the average results of 30 simulations. The con-
fidence intervals for the mean values were calculated for
a 95% confidence level using a model based on Student’s
t-distribution. The average value µ and standard devia-
tion σ for the whole population is unknown. In order to
calculate the confidence intervals for the mean µ of the
population the following formula was used [23]:
P
(
m− t ·σ√
n−1 < µ < m+
t ·σ√
n−1
)
= 1−α , (11)
where m is the sample calculated mean value, σ is the sam-
ple standard deviation, n stands for the sample size, t is
the value from the Student-t distribution for n−1 degrees
of freedom and probability 1−α/2, and 1−α is the con-
fidence factor, which is 0.95. The results are shown in
Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1
Confidence intervals for the mean values of correctly
detected pirates
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
ir
at
es Threshold 0.12 Threshold 0.13 Threshold 0.14
m
t ·σ√
n−1 m
t ·σ√
n−1 m
t ·σ√
n−1
5 5.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 0.00
10 10.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 0.13
15 14.67 0.23 13.43 0.86 10.77 1.47
20 16.03 1.45 11.73 2.11 6.40 2.02
25 15.50 2.71 9.37 3.04 4.63 1.88
30 14.53 3.90 7.80 3.02 3.17 1.51
Table 2
Confidence intervals for the mean values of wrongly
accused users
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
ir
at
es Threshold 0.12 Threshold 0.13 Threshold 0.14
m
t ·σ√
n−1 m
t ·σ√
n−1 m
t ·σ√
n−1
5 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 2.50 1.68 0.37 0.40 0.00 0.00
15 7.37 3.74 1.57 0.99 0.17 0.22
20 10.87 5.45 2.53 1.34 0.40 0.32
25 12.37 6.12 3.60 1.74 0.60 0.40
30 12.84 6.18 4.10 1.90 0.60 0.35
Detection of 100% of the colluders was achieved for every
threshold for 10 or fewer pirates (Fig. 7a, Table 1). For
a threshold of 0.12 a detection rate about 100% of rogue
users was achieved even for 15 colluders (Fig. 7a). More-
over, even for a group of 20 pirates it is still possible to
detect c.a. 80% of them. However, there is a very high
number of suspected innocent users (Fig. 7b). Such low
threshold should be implemented only for high importance
data and when of all rogue users detection is absolutely nec-
essary. In terms of discussed three scenarios one can notice
that a “catch all” scenario can be achieved by using this or
even a lower threshold [21]. For a 0.13 threshold, detection
of c.a. 90% of pirates was achieved for 15 pirates in the
attack (Fig. 7a). Yet it is still possible to detect even 50%
of them for 20 pirates. More importantly, this threshold
implies a very small number wrongly suspected fair users
(Fig. 7b), which is, considering the confidence intervals,
lower than 6 (Table 2). This threshold ensures detection
of a pirates substantial part while reducing the number of
wrongly accused users, which means that the “catch many”
scenario can be achieved. For a 0.14 threshold, pirate de-
tection is significantly degraded (Fig. 7a). However, there
is not a single wrongly accused user for 10 or fewer pirates
(Fig. 7b). Moreover, even for up to 30 colluded pirates the
number of wrongly suspected users is not greater than 1
(Table 2). Such a high threshold should be implemented
when the priority is to achieve reliable detection and strong
evidence for the prosecution. A “catch one” scenario can
be achieved by using this or an even higher threshold.
8. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate the potential er-
ror patterns application which occurred after the decryption
process of presented quaternion encryption algorithm. This
application is digital fingerprinting for images. According
to the presented simulation results it is possible to achieve
satisfactory results in detecting pirates while maintaining
a limited number of wrongly accused users. Being able
to conduct pirate tracing during a collusion attack while
maintaining confidentiality through encryption of the trans-
mitted data would allow to successfully extend the secu-
rity boundaries that are offered by multimedia distribution
systems.
Additionally, it is important to note that when using the
quaternion encryption algorithm the number of possible en-
cryption keys is particularly big. This is due to the fact that
both the rotation order and the 4 initialization quaternion
parameters can be changed [1], [2], [5]–[7]. Thus attacks,
especially on data encrypted with a high rotation order,
are possible but rather complex. The method can be eas-
ily extrapolated to encrypt color images. In this case the
use of quaternion calculus is particularly beneficial, as a
single quaternion can include information about all three
colors of the pixel. This is very effective in terms of the
number of calculations required to encrypt an entire color
image.
In this paper a scheme for digital fingerprinting as an addi-
tional feature of the quaternion encryption scheme is pre-
sented. Nevertheless, most of the image communications
are lossy in nature, so fingerprinting should withstand such
signal processing like compression or filtering. A solution
to this problem is fingerprint embedding in a discrete co-
sine transform or wavelet transform domain, and that is the
purpose of proposed further studies.
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